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| An image of “Christ Pantocrator,” which means almighty or “ruler of all.” Source: Petar MiloÅ¡ević via Wikimedia Commons. |
The Weirdness of Religion
Across history, religious institutions have banned several absurd and arbitrary things. Christians shouldn't work on the Sabbath, Jews shouldn't eat pork, Muslims shouldn't drink alcohol, Hindus shouldn't harm cows, and Buddhists shouldn't point their feet at the Buddha.
There are superficial cultural explanations for these prohibitions, such as believing that an item is impure or impious, but these only beg the question “why is this particular item impure?” Accordingly, anthropologists have theorized that, for a religion to be successful, it doesn't matter what is banned as long as something is.
Their theory is called “costly signaling theory” because those who conform with prohibitions are thought to be enduring difficulty to communicate something to other people. Besides prohibitions, these costly signals can include other varieties of religious weirdness, such as rituals and symbolic markers of affiliation.
For example, there is a tribe in Papua New Guinea where young males have their private parts forcibly lacerated by stinging nettles. Meanwhile, Hindus have a ritual that involves dragging carts attached by hooks to their skin, Mbuti pygmies have a festival that transforms a rusty old pipe into a sacred flute, and Catholics have a ritual in which bread becomes the body of the Messiah.
Perhaps the clearest examples of costly signals are “badges,” such as tattoos, jewelry, special clothing, and grooming habits. For example, Jews wear skullcaps, Sikhs don't cut their hair, Muslim women wear burkas, Polynesians display tattoos, and Christians wear crucifixes.
To an evolutionary biologist, these bans, badges, and behaviors would appear to be a waste of time, energy, and resources (e.g., burning food on an altar). Our species needed to hunt, gather, find shelter, and wage war, so how they these costly signals evolve?
A simple explanation is that the signals were useful because they publicly demonstrated faith, commitment, conformity, and affiliation. Indeed, the signals are noticeable and public, which suggests that they are a form of communication. However, there is a deeper explanation for why costly signaling has survived human evolution.
Anthropologists such as Richard Sosis and Joe Bulbulia think that costly signaling theory can explain these unusual behaviors. The general idea is that it doesn't matter what specific thing is banned (pork, beef, or dancing a jig), worn, or ritually performed, as long as the behavior is:
The evolutionary reason for these costly, noticeable, and bizarre signals appears to be that they helped people to cooperate with each other and to defeat their less cooperative enemies. This benefit outweighed the cost of the signals.
The signals increased cooperation because most religions include morals that promote cooperative living, such as to not murder, steal, or commit adultery. A costly signal of commitment to a religion can therefore establish trust in a religious person's willingness to behave altruistically and adhere to a moral code. For example, even secular New Yorkers have been found to prefer Mormon nannies.
Lack of cooperation may have been the most important problem for ancient societies to overcome, with cheaters and free-riders extracting benefits but not enduring costs. Costly, noticeable, and unmistakably religious signals of cooperation provided an effective tool to weed out the unwilling (better than spoken promises). Nonbelievers would have found the costly signals difficult or undesirable to fake (e.g., a painful ritual, or giving up alcohol).
Some studies have tested whether groups with high membership demands (i.e., more costly signaling) enjoy the highest levels of devotion and commitment. For example, a study found that high-demand groups grow at a faster rate and have more committed members than low-demand groups, and that religious bizarreness is associated with attendance at services.
Other surveys have found that Muslims, Mormons, Baptists, and Seventh Day Adventists have added to their numbers quicker than more liberal Protestant churches. Similarly, the liberalization of the Catholic Church in the 1960s appears to have accelerated its decline.
Different studies have tested whether high-demand groups enjoy the highest levels of cooperation. For example, a study of 83 early American communes found that those that survived (i.e., cooperated better) were more likely to be religious and to impose costly requirements on their members (e.g., celibacy, or giving up material possessions).
Another study found that the collapse of the “kibbutz” (commune) movement in Israel was largely limited to secular communes. Most of the religious communes survived and remained profitable after imposing costly signals on their members (e.g., not doing business on the Sabbath). Importantly, these communes also showed the highest levels of cooperation among individuals using costly signals (typically males).
Haredi Jews provide another example. They came to Israel from Russia but continued to wear thick clothing and fur hats in the desert sun. It became a costly signal of their faith. (Why else would they suffer the heat unless they truly believed?) The signal appeared to facilitate a remarkable level of cooperation. Even when they are complete strangers, Haredi Jews will stay in each other's houses, lend their cars, and provide interest-free loans.
Accordingly, a model that tested whether costly signals (i.e., bans, badges, and rituals) can evolve in a population, despite the cost to the individuals performing them, found that the signals evolve because of the cooperative response they elicit.
Consistent with the above, religious signaling also appears to increase when more cooperation is needed. A study found that harsh economic conditions in Indonesia led to greater religious attendance. The suggestion is that, in challenging times, the need to cooperate and weed out cheaters and free-riders is greater. However, the results could also be explained by a greater need for comfort.
There are many types of costly signal between humans (e.g., signals of wealth, status, skill, attractiveness, emotional need, and willingness to fight) and between social animals (e.g., elephants). The technical definition requires that all these signals:
The costly signaling theory of religion meets this definition, but it only concerns one case of costly signaling within one species.
In contrast to rituals and badges, bans are only useful as signals when they are at risk of being transgressed. This makes them effective at weeding out nonbelievers, particularly when the banned items are desirable or difficult to give up (e.g., sex, alcohol, pork, or watching television).
Conversely, for believers, removing these desirable “vices” means that there are fewer activities competing for their time, leading to religious activities becoming more desirable and less costly.
These benefits, which ensure a group in which everyone can be trusted to cooperate, may be why desirable and tempting items like pork and alcohol are the most effective types of bans. Although anything could conceivably be banned, these types of bans are the costliest signals to send.
Religious beliefs can increase the perceived benefits of costly signaling. For example, if you believe that a ritual will enable you to reach a pleasant afterlife, or be protected by a god, you will be more likely to perform it and, thus, to receive its real benefits (cooperation). This may be important because the real benefits may be less likely to be recognized and acknowledged than supernatural benefits.
Religious beliefs (e.g., in heaven) can also benefit a society if people start to police their own behavior because they think it is being judged by a watchful deity (thus providing another way to increase cooperation). Policing behavior in a large society also becomes easier when enforcers only need to police the public observance of costly signals.
Remarkably, signaling theory proposes that the mere performance of a costly signal can increase religious belief. It is suggested that nonbelievers who utilize a signal (e.g., going to Church for social benefits rather than to worship) experience an unpleasant state of “cognitive dissonance”—a conflict between their beliefs and their repeated, public actions,—which forces a resolution (e.g., start believing or stop going to Church).
Studies of cults suggest that the resolution is usually to “start believing.” Cults appear to introduce new members to costly signaling (e.g., leafletting on the street, or participating in group activities) before successfully brainwashing them with the cult's idiosyncratic teachings.
Consistent with the above, sending a costly signal may elicit emotions that make the signal's underlying beliefs appear more compelling. For example, a “religious experience” may be perceived as “more real” than reality, while singing in synchrony with a group may produce positive emotions that help nonbelievers to identify with the group's beliefs.
Finally, if nonbelievers remain unconvinced, they will find it difficult to fake the involuntary emotional responses of genuine believers, which further bolsters the reliability of the signal as an indicator of true commitment.
Although costly signaling theory can explain many features of religious practices, including why they endure, it does not explain why individuals choose to form the beliefs that are the basis for these behaviors.
For example, why do religious beliefs address existential questions and concerns? Why are they determined or constrained by psychological biases? Cognitive and emotional explanations for religion are better placed to answer these questions.
The most that signaling theory can say is that some of these psychological biases and motivations were favored and potentially shaped by natural selection because they resulted in behaviors that helped us to cooperate.
In other words, evolutionary explanations for religion can describe why a practice endures, but not why it came to be. Indeed, signaling theory applies to many aspects of human and animal life, and its explanation for religion can only ever be a general one.
For example, there is a tribe in Papua New Guinea where young males have their private parts forcibly lacerated by stinging nettles. Meanwhile, Hindus have a ritual that involves dragging carts attached by hooks to their skin, Mbuti pygmies have a festival that transforms a rusty old pipe into a sacred flute, and Catholics have a ritual in which bread becomes the body of the Messiah.
Perhaps the clearest examples of costly signals are “badges,” such as tattoos, jewelry, special clothing, and grooming habits. For example, Jews wear skullcaps, Sikhs don't cut their hair, Muslim women wear burkas, Polynesians display tattoos, and Christians wear crucifixes.
To an evolutionary biologist, these bans, badges, and behaviors would appear to be a waste of time, energy, and resources (e.g., burning food on an altar). Our species needed to hunt, gather, find shelter, and wage war, so how they these costly signals evolve?
A simple explanation is that the signals were useful because they publicly demonstrated faith, commitment, conformity, and affiliation. Indeed, the signals are noticeable and public, which suggests that they are a form of communication. However, there is a deeper explanation for why costly signaling has survived human evolution.
 |
| An initiation ritual among young males from Malawi. Source: Steve Evans via Wikimedia Commons. |
Costly Signaling Theory
Anthropologists such as Richard Sosis and Joe Bulbulia think that costly signaling theory can explain these unusual behaviors. The general idea is that it doesn't matter what specific thing is banned (pork, beef, or dancing a jig), worn, or ritually performed, as long as the behavior is:
- Costly. It requires effort or resources to perform or maintain. It is an indicator of dedication. It is difficult for nonbelievers to fake.
- Noticeable. It is communicated effectively because it either comes up in daily life (e.g., refusing to eat pork at a restaurant) or is important at a particular time (e.g., an annual festival).
- Bizarre. It can be easily attributed to a religious function (e.g., pleasing to a deity) and not to any mundane function.
The evolutionary reason for these costly, noticeable, and bizarre signals appears to be that they helped people to cooperate with each other and to defeat their less cooperative enemies. This benefit outweighed the cost of the signals.
The signals increased cooperation because most religions include morals that promote cooperative living, such as to not murder, steal, or commit adultery. A costly signal of commitment to a religion can therefore establish trust in a religious person's willingness to behave altruistically and adhere to a moral code. For example, even secular New Yorkers have been found to prefer Mormon nannies.
Lack of cooperation may have been the most important problem for ancient societies to overcome, with cheaters and free-riders extracting benefits but not enduring costs. Costly, noticeable, and unmistakably religious signals of cooperation provided an effective tool to weed out the unwilling (better than spoken promises). Nonbelievers would have found the costly signals difficult or undesirable to fake (e.g., a painful ritual, or giving up alcohol).
Testing the Costly Signaling Theory
Some studies have tested whether groups with high membership demands (i.e., more costly signaling) enjoy the highest levels of devotion and commitment. For example, a study found that high-demand groups grow at a faster rate and have more committed members than low-demand groups, and that religious bizarreness is associated with attendance at services.
Other surveys have found that Muslims, Mormons, Baptists, and Seventh Day Adventists have added to their numbers quicker than more liberal Protestant churches. Similarly, the liberalization of the Catholic Church in the 1960s appears to have accelerated its decline.
Different studies have tested whether high-demand groups enjoy the highest levels of cooperation. For example, a study of 83 early American communes found that those that survived (i.e., cooperated better) were more likely to be religious and to impose costly requirements on their members (e.g., celibacy, or giving up material possessions).
Another study found that the collapse of the “kibbutz” (commune) movement in Israel was largely limited to secular communes. Most of the religious communes survived and remained profitable after imposing costly signals on their members (e.g., not doing business on the Sabbath). Importantly, these communes also showed the highest levels of cooperation among individuals using costly signals (typically males).
Haredi Jews provide another example. They came to Israel from Russia but continued to wear thick clothing and fur hats in the desert sun. It became a costly signal of their faith. (Why else would they suffer the heat unless they truly believed?) The signal appeared to facilitate a remarkable level of cooperation. Even when they are complete strangers, Haredi Jews will stay in each other's houses, lend their cars, and provide interest-free loans.
Accordingly, a model that tested whether costly signals (i.e., bans, badges, and rituals) can evolve in a population, despite the cost to the individuals performing them, found that the signals evolve because of the cooperative response they elicit.
Consistent with the above, religious signaling also appears to increase when more cooperation is needed. A study found that harsh economic conditions in Indonesia led to greater religious attendance. The suggestion is that, in challenging times, the need to cooperate and weed out cheaters and free-riders is greater. However, the results could also be explained by a greater need for comfort.
 |
| The Theyyam ritual from India is particularly noticeable. Source: Shagil Kannur via Wikimedia Commons. |
The General Features of Costly Signals
There are many types of costly signal between humans (e.g., signals of wealth, status, skill, attractiveness, emotional need, and willingness to fight) and between social animals (e.g., elephants). The technical definition requires that all these signals:
- Communicate an attribute that varies within a population (e.g., levels of religious commitment).
- Benefit the receiver of the signal with reliable information (e.g., knowing who to trust and cooperate with).
- Benefit the sender of the signal (e.g., people cooperating with them) such that other people may be tempted to fake the signal if they can endure the cost of sending it.
- Are costlier for people who lack the attribute being communicated (e.g., religious commitment). In the case of religion, believers may have already conformed to a lifestyle that makes sending the signal easier (e.g., giving up vices may be more difficult for skeptics).
The costly signaling theory of religion meets this definition, but it only concerns one case of costly signaling within one species.
What is Special About Bans? Why Pork and Alcohol?
In contrast to rituals and badges, bans are only useful as signals when they are at risk of being transgressed. This makes them effective at weeding out nonbelievers, particularly when the banned items are desirable or difficult to give up (e.g., sex, alcohol, pork, or watching television).
Conversely, for believers, removing these desirable “vices” means that there are fewer activities competing for their time, leading to religious activities becoming more desirable and less costly.
These benefits, which ensure a group in which everyone can be trusted to cooperate, may be why desirable and tempting items like pork and alcohol are the most effective types of bans. Although anything could conceivably be banned, these types of bans are the costliest signals to send.
What About Religious Beliefs and Emotions?
Religious beliefs can increase the perceived benefits of costly signaling. For example, if you believe that a ritual will enable you to reach a pleasant afterlife, or be protected by a god, you will be more likely to perform it and, thus, to receive its real benefits (cooperation). This may be important because the real benefits may be less likely to be recognized and acknowledged than supernatural benefits.
Religious beliefs (e.g., in heaven) can also benefit a society if people start to police their own behavior because they think it is being judged by a watchful deity (thus providing another way to increase cooperation). Policing behavior in a large society also becomes easier when enforcers only need to police the public observance of costly signals.
Remarkably, signaling theory proposes that the mere performance of a costly signal can increase religious belief. It is suggested that nonbelievers who utilize a signal (e.g., going to Church for social benefits rather than to worship) experience an unpleasant state of “cognitive dissonance”—a conflict between their beliefs and their repeated, public actions,—which forces a resolution (e.g., start believing or stop going to Church).
Studies of cults suggest that the resolution is usually to “start believing.” Cults appear to introduce new members to costly signaling (e.g., leafletting on the street, or participating in group activities) before successfully brainwashing them with the cult's idiosyncratic teachings.
Consistent with the above, sending a costly signal may elicit emotions that make the signal's underlying beliefs appear more compelling. For example, a “religious experience” may be perceived as “more real” than reality, while singing in synchrony with a group may produce positive emotions that help nonbelievers to identify with the group's beliefs.
Finally, if nonbelievers remain unconvinced, they will find it difficult to fake the involuntary emotional responses of genuine believers, which further bolsters the reliability of the signal as an indicator of true commitment.
Closing Remarks
Although costly signaling theory can explain many features of religious practices, including why they endure, it does not explain why individuals choose to form the beliefs that are the basis for these behaviors.
For example, why do religious beliefs address existential questions and concerns? Why are they determined or constrained by psychological biases? Cognitive and emotional explanations for religion are better placed to answer these questions.
The most that signaling theory can say is that some of these psychological biases and motivations were favored and potentially shaped by natural selection because they resulted in behaviors that helped us to cooperate.
In other words, evolutionary explanations for religion can describe why a practice endures, but not why it came to be. Indeed, signaling theory applies to many aspects of human and animal life, and its explanation for religion can only ever be a general one.
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